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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 2 - 2 (3) (j) 
(2002). This Court granted certiorari on November 29,2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
Whether Dessert Diversified Development had the authority as a beneficial 
owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions? 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. The standard of review is to 
review the issues of law for correctness with no deference to the trial court. 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2002 UT 8, para. 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING ISSUE WAS PRESERVED 
Power of a Trust Beneficiary to Deal with Trust Assets. R-00380 ("Ruling 
and Order"). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 ("Utah Statute of Frauds")(1998): 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not one 
5 
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (Wrongful Lien, "Definitions") (2005): 
""Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: . 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57- 1 - 12 ("Form of warranty deed - Effect") (2000). 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and 
privileges thereunto belonging, . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 3 - 1 0 3 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000). 
"Every document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). 
"The common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to, or in 
conflict with, the constitution of laws of the United States, or the 
constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and 
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adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the 
necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1965 F.E. Bates and his wife, Mae P. Bates, deeded 4,264.68 acres (more 
or less) in Summit County, Utah, by warranty deed to "Security Title Company, 
Trustee, a corporation of Utah." A copy of the 1965 Bates deed is Addendum 
Document "1." [R-00172]. There is no contemporary evidence that a trust 
actually existed or who may have been the beneficiaries in 1965. There is no 
evidence of the terms of the trust. No trust document (e.g., will or declaration of 
trust) has ever been produced. 
Six years later, on March 18,1971, Deseret Diversified Development 
("Deseret") was incorporated in Utah. 
Four months later, on July 8,1971, Deseret executed and recorded a set of 
CC&R's ("Reservations and Restrictive Covenants Forest Meadow Ranch") 
against "The South half of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian " [R-0023 et seq., "Original 1971 CC&R's"]. These CC&R's 
were then amended by whiting out and typing over the word "South" in the 
property description so it read "The South half of Section 22, Township 1 North, 
Range 4 East." The amended CC&R's were recorded on August 19,1971 (the 
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"Rerecorded CC&R's," R-00448 et seq.). A copy is attached as Addendum 
document "2." 
The Court of Appeals states as a fact that the amendment was made by Mr. 
W. Brent Jensen, the individual who signed the original CC&R's, but, the record 
does not show who actually did it. Petitioner cannot prove W. Brent Jensen didn't 
do it, but respectfully reminds the Court that the rule of law is that all factual 
inferences are to be drawn in its favor.1 
The Rerecorded CC&R's do not provide for annual assessments. They are 
"development CC&R's" that contemplate that the 320 acres will be sold in bulk to 
homebuilders and developers who will then work together to develop the area. 
They provide for assessments for development expenses (e.g., for roads and 
infrastructure) to be prorated by acreage, not for annual maintenance assessments 
to be prorated by lot. 
The area covered by the Rerecorded CC&R's is the south half of Section 22, 
roughly 320 of the 4,264.68 acres conveyed by the Bates Deed. The area is a 
rectangle roughly one mile wide west to east and half a mile wide north to south. 
About a year later, on August 9,1972, Security Title recorded the "Plat for 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D," Appendix document "3"[ R-00023-26]. The south 
1
 Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66 para. 23,100 P.3d 1163,1166. 
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east corner of the platted area is inside the rectangular area covered by the 
Rerecorded CC&R's, but most of the platted area is not. Most of the platted area 
is either in the north half of Section 22 or in Section 21 to the west. The 
relationship of the platted area to the rectangular area is shown in the map which is 
Appendix document "4" [R-0059]. 
Both Security Title and Deseret Diversified signed the plat's "Owner's 
Dedication," which reads as follows: 
" OWNER'S DEDICATION 
"Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned owners of 
the above described tract of land, having caused the same to be subdivided 
into lots and streets hereafter to be known as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH 
PLAT 'D' do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of 
land shown on this plat as intended for public use. 
Deseret Diversified /s/ W. Brent Jensen 
Development Corporation by W. Brent Jensen, President 
/s/ Lee Ann Hunter 
Secretary 
/s/ Leo D. Jensen 
Vice President 
/s/L.R. Wright 
Secretary 
The Court of Appeals states that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat for both 
Deseret and Security Title as the president of both corporations, but that is false. 
Security Title Company, 
as Trustee by 
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The truth is that Leo D. Jensen signed for Security Title as its vice president.2 
The Court of Appeals then held that this false fact (i.e., that W. Brent Jensen had 
signed the plat as president of both Security Title and Deseret) proved as a matter 
of law that (1) there actually was a trust in 1965, (2) the beneficiaries of that trust 
in 1965 were "the interests that became Deseret," and (3) Deseret had become the 
trust beneficiary in 1971. 
On January 15,1975, Security Title conveyed lot 105 in the platted area 
(1 .e., Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D) to Jensen Investment. The Court of Appeals 
held that Jensen Investment was another corporation controlled by W. Brent 
Jensen. The record does not show this, but, in fact, W. Brent Jensen was an 
incorporator and initial director of Jensen Investment. The subsequent deed from 
Jensen Investment to its grantee was signed by "Kent Jensen" [R-0043].3 
Lot 105 was subsequently divided into lot 105 and lot 105A. Lot 105A is 
Petitioner's lot. The southern part of the lot is covered by the Rerecorded 
2
 Petitioner has obtained a certified copy of Security Title's complete file 
from the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and the name W. 
Brent Jensen does not appear as incorporator, director or officer at any time. In 
fact, his name does not appear at all. 
3
 Petitioner has obtained a certified copy of Jensen Investment's complete 
file from the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and W. Brent 
Jensen is shown as an incorporator and initial director. 
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CC&R's. The northern part is not. The relationship of lot 105A to the rectangular 
area covered by the Rereccorded CC&R's and to the irregular outline of the 
subdivision is shown by the map, Addendum document "4" [R-0059]. 
Lot 105 A was eventually conveyed by warranty deed to Axel Grabowski, 
Petitioner's president, who conveyed it to Petitioner on December 9,1999. 
In 1980 Respondent recorded a Notice of Lien in which it claimed authority 
to make annual assessments against Lot 105A under the Rerecorded CC&R's. A 
copy of the 1980 Notice of Lien is attached as Addendum Document "5" [R-
0050]. 
For many years Respondent did not make any assessments (neither for 
annual maintenance nor for development expenses) against the lots in the South 
half of Section 22 or against the lots in the Forest Meadow Subdivisions. The 
roads and other improvements were maintained by a Summit County Special 
Service District which used its taxing authority to collect the necessary money. 
This made the question of the validity of the Rerecorded CC&R's moot. But, in 
late 1999 Summit County decided to dissolve the special service district and 
Respondent announced it was going to start making annual assessments. In 
December, 1999, before Respondent had made any assessments, Petitioner filed a 
petition to have the 1980 Notice of Lien declared wrongful lien under the Utah 
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Wrongful Lien Statute4 on the grounds that neither it nor the Rerecorded CC&R's 
had been signed by the owner of record, Security Title. Respondent countered that 
the 1980 Notice of Lien was authorized by the Rerecorded CC&R's and they were 
valid because they had been signed by Deseret as the beneficiary of the trust 
evidenced by the Bates Deed and on other grounds. 
Petitioner and Respondent both moved for summary judgment on the basis 
of the recorded documents - the Bates Deed, the Rerecorded CC&R's, the Plat, 
the 1980 Notice of Lien and the deeds in Petitioner's chain of title. The trial court 
denied Petitioner's motion and granted Respondent's motion. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals Petitioner argued: 
(1) the Rerecorded CC&R's were void under the Utah Statute of Frauds because 
they were not been signed and acknowledged after the property description was 
changed, (2) there was no trust because there was no identifiable trust beneficiary, 
trust document or terms of trust in 1965, (3) Deseret could not have been the trust 
beneficiary in 1965 because it was not incorporated until 1971, (3) there was no 
evidence that Deseret had become the trust beneficiary in 1971 when the 
Rerecorded CC&R's were recorded, (4) assuming Deseret was the trust 
beneficiary in 1971 and the 320 acres were trust property, Deseret had no 
4
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 -1 et seq. (2005). 
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authority as trust beneficiary to bind the land with CC&R's, (5) since the trustee 
held the land in fee simple estate, Deseret as trust beneficiary had no estate and, 
therefore, could not be in privity of estate with subsequent purchasers from 
Security Title, and (6) the Rerecorded CC&R's were void for non-uniformity 
because they only covered a small part of Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D. 
The Court of Appeals rejected all Petitioner's arguments. It held that the 
plat had been signed for Security Title by W. Brent Jensen as its president (this 
was false) and since W. Brent Jensen also signed for Deseret Diversified, this 
proved as a matter of law that "the interests that became Deseret Diversified" were 
the trust beneficiaries in 1965 and that Deseret Diversified was the trust 
beneficiary in 1971. It further held that as trust beneficiary Deseret Diversified 
had authority to impose binding CC&R's on the land and was in privity of estate 
with subsequent purchasers from Security Title. It went on to hold that even if 
Deseret Diversified did not have authority to impose the CC&R's as trust 
beneficiary, Security Title had subsequently ratified the Rerecorded CC&R's by 
signing and recording the plat. Finally, it held that the record did not show there 
was any nommiformity. 
Petitioner sought certiorari as to all these rulings. On November 29,2005, 
this Court granted certiorari limited to the issue: 
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"Whether Deseret Diversified Development had authority as a beneficial 
owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All the relevant facts are stated in the foregoing Statement of the case 
and Petitioner incorporates them by this reference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In summary, Petitioner argues: 
(1) The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's") on land and other powers of 
disposition. 
(2) A trust beneficiary (although a beneficial owner) has no power of 
disposition over trust property because the rule of law is that "the trustee has 
exclusive control over trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by 
law or the trust instrument." 
(3) Because the names of the trust beneficiaries usually do not appear in the 
real estate records (as illustrated by this case), holding that a trust beneficiary has 
power of disposition over trust real property will compromise the integrity of the 
Utah recording system. 
(4) Holding that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust 
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property will defeat the fundamental basic purpose of trusts - to divide beneficial 
ownership from control of the property to protect the interests of the beneficiary. 
(5) Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's" by signing and 
recording the plat because (a) the CC&R's and the plat cover inconsistent areas 
and have inconsistent purposes, (b) even if Deseret was the beneficiary of Security 
Title, it was not the agent of Security Title, and (c) Deseret did not purport to act 
for Security Title. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. The law makes no distinction between authority to impose binding 
covenants, conditions and restrictions on land and other powers of 
disposition. 
The issue framed by this Court is "whether Deseret Diversified 
Development had authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions." This issue leads immediately to the question of 
whether imposing binding covenants, conditions, and restrictions on land is 
materially different from disposing of land in some other way - e.g., imposing an 
easement, imposing an equitable servitude, or simply selling the land. 
The law makes no distinction between one sort of disposition of land and 
another. The Utah Statute of Frauds provides: 
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"No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared other wise than by operation of law or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing." [Utah Code Ann. sec. 2 5 - 5 - 1 (1998)]. 
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&R's) are interests in real property in 
the nature of real covenants (promises to do), equitable servitudes (promises not to 
do), and easements (non-possessory interests). The law treats them all alike 
because, as a practical matter, authority to impose binding CC&R's is authority to 
determine how land will be used. For example, suppose land is held in trust by T 
for the benefit of B. As trustee T determines that the most valuable use of the land 
is as a farm. If B as beneficial owner has authority to impose binding CC&R's 
limiting the land to residential development, T cannot fulfill the trustee's duty to 
manage the land as a farm. 
In effect, the decision to impose binding CC&R's is just one of many 
economic decisions the trustee must make as trustee. The law cannot carve out the 
particular economic decision to impose binding CC&R's and treat it differently 
from all the other economic decisions the trustee must make. 
2. The long established rule is that "the trustee has exclusive control 
over the trust property, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the 
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trust instrument," and the word "exclusive" precludes the beneficiary from 
haying any power of disposition. 
This Court has said three times that "the trustee has exclusive control over 
the trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust 
instrument."5 This is the uniform American rule.6 It is based on the fundamental 
principle of trust law that the trustee is responsible for the trust property (and the 
beneficiary is not) because the trustee has control (and the beneficiary does not). 
It is true that the beneficiary is the beneficial owner of the trust property, but 
this only means that the trust beneficiary has the risk of loss and chance of gain, 
not that the beneficiary has power of disposition. "Property" in land is frequently 
compared to a bundle of sticks, each stick representing a specific right with 
respect to the land. The trust beneficiary has the "stick" of risk of loss and chance 
of gain (beneficial ownership) but the trustee has the "stick" of power of 
disposition (exclusive control). 
A good analogy to beneficiaries of trust are shareholders of publicly held 
corporations. The shareholders are the beneficial owners of the corporations' 
5
 In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12, 71 P.3d 589, 594; Matter of 
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1997); Continental Bank & Trust Co, v. 
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P. 872 (Utah 1981). 
6
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec 2 (1959). 
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assets because they have risk of loss and chance of gain, but they have no control 
over those assets. The board of directors has control. The analogy of corporate 
law to trust law is so close that corporate law speaks of the duties of the board of 
directors to shareholders as "fiduciary" duties. 
Trust law regards the property interest of the beneficiary not as an interest in 
the trust property but as an interest in the trust itself. Thus, trust beneficiaries of 
non-spendthrift trusts have authority to dispose of their interests in the trust (in 
effect, to substitute their transferees as trust beneficiaries) but not the power to 
dispose of the trust property.7 Again, shareholders of publicly-held corporations 
are a good analogy. The shareholders have authority to sell their shares, but not to 
sell the corporations' assets. 
This division of beneficial ownership (held by the beneficiary) from control 
(held by the trustee) has been the rule of law for centuries. This Court should not 
change it now because stare decisis is important in trust law. Past trust settlors 
and their attorneys have relied on the established rule of law. They did not 
anticipate that the Utah Appellate Court would hold trust beneficiaries have power 
of disposition over trust property. If this Court confirms the existence of this new 
7
 See GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 132-42 (sec. 37 "Nature of Beneficiary's 
Interest" and Sec. 137 "Incidents of the beneficiary's Interest") (6th ed. 1987). 
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power, the trustees of these established trusts will not be able to protect their 
beneficiaries from the consequences of their beneficiaries' improvidence. 
3. The decision of this Court in Capital Assets Financial Services v. 
Maxwell does not stand for the proposition that beneficiaries have power of 
disposition over trust property. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that a trust beneficiary has power of 
disposition in the following paragraph: 
"Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a beneficial 
interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed, Deseret could not encumber 
Lot 105A. However, Petitioner cites no authority stating that a beneficiary 
cannot encumber the trust res. In fact, there is authority to the contrary. 
See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell 2000 UT 9, para. 17,994 P.2d 
201 (holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that 
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest for the trees. 
Deseret's actions were subsequently ratified by Security when Deseret and 
Security filed Plat D." [2005 UT App 294, para. 36] 
It is true that Petitioner cited no authority to the effect that a trust beneficiary 
cannot encumber trust property, but the absence of negative authority is not the 
same thing as positive authority. The common law rule is that the trustee has 
exclusive control, and Utah adopted the common law rule in 1898 by statute.8 The 
8
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 6 8 - 3 - 1 ("Common law adopted") (2004). The 
common law rale governed in 1965 when the Bates Deed was delivered. Utah 
enacted the common law rule as the statutory rule in 1975 by enacting the Uniform 
Trustee's Powers Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. sec. 
75-7-40 etseq. (1993). 
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critical question is "what did the Utah Supreme Court actually hold in the case the 
Court of Appeals cites as positive authority, Capital Assets Financial Services v. 
MaxwellT 
The facts in Capital Assets Financial Services are simple. A judgment had 
been entered against Christensen in favor of Lindsay. Christensen, the judgment 
debtor, wanted to borrow $50,000, so he asked a friend to transfer some real 
property to him to use as collateral. Lott, the daughter of the friend, provided the 
collateral by transferring some land to Christensen by unqualified quitclaim deed 
on the understanding that he would use it as collateral and then deed it back to her. 
Christensen obtained the $50,000 loan from Capital Assets on a deed of trust and 
then deeded the land (now subject to Capital Assets' deed of trust) back to Lott. 
Lindsay (Christensen's judgment creditor) claimed that as soon as Lott 
transferred the land to Christensen by quitclaim deed, his judgment lien attached 
and therefore Capital Assets' deed of trust was subordinate. Capital Assets 
countered with the argument that Christensen had taken the land as a trustee for 
the benefit of Lott as trust beneficiary, and, therefore, no judgment lien attached 
under the established rule that a judgment lien does not attach to trust property 
held by a trustee in trust for the benefit of another person. 
This Court refused to characterize the relationship between Christensen and 
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Lott as a trust. In paragraph "17" this Court held: 
"There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal title 
possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial interest that Christensen 
undisputably possessed here. Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is purely for the 
benefit of another. In the instant case, Christensen received from Lott more 
than bare legal title. The quitclaim deed was consistent with passing a fee 
interest and the intent of the parties was to allow Christensen to use the 
property as security for his own benefit. To hold that Christensen's interest 
was a non-beneficial "bare legal title" would be inconsistent with chain of 
title and the intent of the parties." [2000 UT 9, para. 17, 994 P.2d 201,205]. 
This is the same paragraph "17" that was cited by the Court of Appeals as holding 
that a trust beneficiary has power of disposition over trust property. 
It is impossible to reconcile this Court's actual holding (that there was no 
trust) with the Court of Appeals' statement of the holding (that a trust beneficiary 
has power to encumber). No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of 
Appeal's holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of 
"innocent mistake" or even "negligent mistake." The truth is sometimes a matter 
of degree - as when the defendant claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded 
when he accidentally shot his wife - six times. 
Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to think about the question of why the 
Court of Appeals so mischaracterized this Court's holding. The degree of falsity 
is on a par with its holding that W. Brent Jensen signed the plat for Security Title 
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when the document was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen. Could any Utah judge 
write the words "[W. Brent] Jensen signed on behalf of both Security and Deseret" 
without reading the plat? Could any Utah judge write the words "holding 
beneficial interest in real property could encumber that interest" without reading 
this Court's opinion? If the Court of Appeals did read the plat and the opinion, 
why did it make these false statements? 
4. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over real 
property held in trust will compromise the integrity of the Utah recording 
system. 
The holding of the Court of Appeals in this case is extraordinary in that it 
gives Deseret as trust beneficiary the authority to impose binding CC&R's even 
though its status as trust beneficiary does not appear of record. In fact, there is no 
indication in the record of who was the trust beneficiary in 1965 or in 1971. The 
only way the Court of Appeals could justify its holding Deseret was a trust 
beneficiary in 1971 was to falsely describe W. Brent Jensen as signing the plat for 
Security Title as its president (when the plat was actually signed by Leo D. Jensen 
as its vice president) and then, without citing any rule of law, to hold that this false 
fact proved as a matter of law that the interests that became Deseret were the trust 
beneficiaries in 1965 and that Deseret was the trust beneficiary in 1971. 
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Under Utah real property law, if a person other than the record owner has 
power of disposition over Utah real property, the expectation is that the power will 
appear of record. For example, if X gives Y power of disposition over land held 
of record by X, the expectation is that X will record a written power of attorney 
naming Y as X's agent, describing the property, and expressly granting Y power 
of disposition. 
Any power of disposition that is valid but not of record threatens the 
integrity of the Utah recording system because the exercise of that power will be 
by a deed that is both wild and valid. 
The point is best explained in three steps. The first step is to explain why 
trust instruments with respect to real property are virtually never recorded. This 
may strike the Court as strange because the Utah Statute of Frauds expressly 
requires a written document to create a trust with respect to real property. Why is 
it the uniform practice not to record these written documents? 
Three good reasons are: (1) recording is a meaningless gesture, (2) 
recording makes any subsequent transferee's title less secure, and (3) recording 
makes information public that most people prefer to keep private. 
On the first reason, suppose land is deeded to "T as trustee." Does it matter 
whether there actually is a trust or not? It does not. If there is no trust, T has 
23 
exclusive control over the land as both record and beneficial owner.9 If there is a 
trust, T has exclusive control over the land as trustee. Therefore, whether there 
actually is a trust or not (or what the terms of the trust may be, or who the 
beneficiaries of the trust may be) is of absolutely no importance at to anyone with 
whom the trustee deals. Recording the trust is a meaningless gesture. 
As for the second reason - that recording makes any transferee's title less 
secure - suppose the trust document is recorded and then the trustee sells the 
property in possible violation of the terms of the trust. The person who bought the 
land may have acquired defective title due to constructive notice (due to the trust 
having been recorded) of the violation.10 The transferee's title is safer if the trust 
document is not recorded. 
On the third reason, recording a trust makes the trust a public document. 
Criminals and nosey people may read the document and use the information they 
obtain to make trouble for the trust beneficiaries and their families. 
So, the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument even though the 
Utah Statute of Frauds requires that a trust in any manner relating to real property 
9
 This is the effect of Utah Code Ann. sec. 57-1-12 ("Form of warranty 
deed - Effect") and 57 -1 -13 ("Form of quitclaim deed - Effect") (2000). 
10
 See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 406 ("Third persons protected in dealing 
with trustee") and sec. 75 - 7 - 409 (2) (1993). 
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be in writing. 
The second step of the analysis is to see that while the actual existence of 
the trust is irrelevant if the trustee has exclusive control (whether as absolute 
owner or as trustee), it makes a great deal of difference if the trust beneficiary has 
power of disposition. If deeding land to "T as trustee" gives power of disposition 
to unnamed beneficiaries, then it very much matters whether there actually is a 
trust, what the terms of the trust are, and who are the beneficiaries. 
Please note that a deed to "T as trustee" (like the 1965 Bates deed in this 
case) is insufficient to create a trust in itself because it does not name the 
beneficiaries or state the terms of the trust. It just conveys the property to T.11 
The third step is to understand the logic of the Utah recording system. The 
logic goes in a three stage process like the game of baseball. 
In baseball the fist stage is for the pitcher to throw the ball over the plate. If 
the pitcher can't do this, the batter gets to go to first base without even trying to hit 
the ball. However, if the pitcher throws the ball over the plate, the game goes to 
the second stage. The batter has to hit the ball. If the batter doesn't hit the ball 
11
 It would, of course, be possible to create a trust by a deed that designated 
the grantee as trustee, identified the beneficiaries, stated the terms of the trust and 
conveyed the land as trust property, Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 409 (l)(a) 
(1993), see GEORGE A. BOGART, TRUSTS 22 (Sec. 10 (b) (6th ed. 1987). 
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(and it crosses the plate three times), the batter is out without the fielders even 
trying to make a play. But if the batter does hit the ball, the game goes to the third 
stage. The fielders have to make a play. 
Each stage is reached if and only if the prior step is accomplished. If the 
pitcher doesn't throw the ball over the plate, the batter can stand there looking at 
the clouds. If the batter doesn't hit the ball, the fielders can pass their time playing 
video games. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds and the Utah Recording Act sets up a similar 
three stage process. The fist stage is for the person asserting the interest in real 
property to produce the written instrument creating that interest. In this case, that 
written instrument would be a trust document naming Security Title as trustee, 
naming the beneficiaries, and stating the terms of the trust. 
If Respondent had produced that trust document (if effect, throwing the ball 
over the plate), the law would go to the second stage. Petitioner could claim the 
trust document was void as to it under the Utah Recording Act because it was 
never recorded.12 If Petitioner made that claim (in effect, hitting the ball), the law 
would go on to the third stage. It would be up to Respondent to show that 
Petitioner could have discovered the trust document by reasonable inquiry (in 
12
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 3 -103 ("Effect of failure to record") (2000). 
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effect, making a play). 
The point is that Respondent has not produced the trust document. The first 
stage of the law was never accomplished. Therefore, under the express language 
of the Utah Statute of Frauds, Deseret's power of disposition over real property 
was never validly created even if Deseret was the actual beneficiary of the trust. 
Deseret can be the actual trust beneficiary without compromising the integrity of 
the Utah recording system, but it can't have authority to impose binding CC&R's 
without compromising the integrity of the Utah recording system. 
The Utah Court of Appeals dealt with the three stage process of the Utah 
recording system by ignoring the first stage. In effect, it held that the word 
"trustee" on the Bates deed put Petitioner on inquiry notice that there might be a 
trust. This is perfectly true but totally insufficient. Petitioner being put on notice 
that there might be a trust is not the same thing as Respondent producing the trust 
document. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, no trust document, no trust. 
Respondent never threw the ball over the plate. 
Finally, the reason why the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals will 
destroy the integrity of the Utah recording system is that when a deed shows that 
land is held in trust (e.g., by "T as trustee under the X family trust dated January 1, 
2006"), and someone records a wild deed purporting to dispose of the land in some 
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way (e.g., by imposing CC&R's) the record will not show whether the person 
recording the wild deed was or was not a trust beneficiary because the trust 
document will not have been recorded. But, under the holding of the Court of 
Appeals, even if the trust document is never produced (as it has never been 
produced in this case), if the trial court thinks that the person signing the wild 
deed actually was a trust beneficiary (perhaps not on fabricated evidence as in this 
case, but on some valid evidence), the trial court must validate the wild deed. 
5. Holding that trust beneficiaries have power of disposition over trust 
property will defeat the basic purpose of trusts - to protect the beneficiary's 
beneficial ownership by holding the trustee responsible for the control of the 
trust property. 
The basic purpose of a trust is to protect the beneficiary's beneficial 
ownership of the trust property by holding the trustee responsible for the control 
of the trust property. People do not create trusts because they want the 
beneficiaries to have control of the trust property. They create trusts because they 
want the trustees to have control of the trust property. 
"Control of the trust property" means making decisions with respect to the 
trust property - decisions like whether land is to be developed for residential use, 
or farmed, or rented out, or sold, or whatever. "Control of the trust property" can 
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be more complicated than simply maximizing economic value. For example, a 
trust instrument may make the trustee responsible for managing a farm while 
preserving it as a farm and not turning it into something like a subdivision. 
If the trust beneficiary has authority to impose binding CC&R's (or any 
similar power of disposition), the trustee cannot fulfill the duty imposed by the 
terms of the trust. For example, suppose that a married couple, are getting on in 
years and set up an estate plan in the form of an intervivos trust. The general 
terms of the trust are income to them for their joint lives, income to the surviving 
spouse for life, and on the death of the surviving spouse for the trust property to be 
distributed to their children. This Court dealt with this sort of trust in 2003 in In 
Re Estate of Flake.13 Anyway, the married couple are the initial trustees but after 
some years they decide to turn over the job to one of their sons because they no 
longer trust their own judgments. Then the husband dies. More years pass and the 
surviving wife is now 90 years old and somewhat forgetful. She lives in a 
retirement community and leaves all financial decisions to her son as trustee - but 
she does not lack the legal capacity to make a contract.. 
The surviving wife is the sole income beneficiary. The children have future 
reminder interests but the son as trustee has power to invade corpus as he 
13
 2003UT17,71P.3d589. 
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considers necessary or appropriate for the health and welfare of his mother. The 
trust is irrevocable and cannot be amended. Finally, the trust says nothing about 
whether the surviving spouse has any power of disposition over the trust assets. 
One of the assets held in trust is a tract of land title to which is held of 
record by the son "as trustee under the X Family Trust." The declaration of trust 
was not recorded. 
The issue is whether the surviving wife as beneficial owner has authority to 
impose binding CC&R's on the tract of land - exactly the same issue as in this 
case but with a complete factual setting, an actual trust document and known 
beneficiaries. 
There is no conceivable reason why the established rule of law (that the 
trustee has the exclusive control over the trust property subject to the terms of the 
trust instrument and the law) should be overturned to give such a power to the 
surviving wife. The whole purpose of the trust is for the son to be responsible for 
making all the economic decisions. The economic decision to impose binding 
CC&R's cannot be pulled out and treated differently than the others. 
The law will have to go either all one way or all the other - either stay with 
the established rule that the trustee has exclusive control or permit the trust 
beneficiary to make whatever economic decisions she wants. If the law takes the 
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latter route, the son cannot protect his mother from evil people who prey on the 
elderly. 
Sometimes courts don't appreciate the practical consequences of the 
decisions they make for the very best abstract reasons. In the world of legal 
abstractions, its seems plausible that the beneficial owner of land should be able to 
dispose of it in whatever way she pleases. But, on a practical level, how many 
Californian hunters would come to Utah if Utah declared open season on hunting 
deer? And as a practical matter, what will happen if this Court declares open 
season on hunting elderly trust beneficiaries? 
6. Security Title did not "ratify" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing 
the plat because (1) Deseret was not its agent, (2) Deseret did not purport to 
act for Security Title, (3) the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with 
respect to real property to be in writing, and (4) the plat and the Rerecorded 
CC&R's are inconsistent with each other. 
The Court of Appeals decided this case on alternative grounds - (1) that 
Deseret as beneficial owner had authority to impose binding CC&R's, and (2) that 
Security Title "ratified" the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing and recording the 
plat. But, this Court limited certiorari to one issue, "whether Deseret Diversified 
Development had the authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, 
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conditions, and restrictions." This limitation raises the question of whether this 
Court sent Petitioner on a fool's errand because even if Petitioner persuades the 
Court that Deseret did not have direct authority as trust beneficiary, this Court will 
not permit Petitioner to challenge the alternative grounds. 
Petitioner does not believe it has been sent on a fool's errand because both 
grounds of decision go to "authority" - to the authority of the beneficiary to 
impose binding CC&R's on its own behalf (the first grounds) or to the authority of 
the beneficiary to do so on behalf of its trustee (the alternative grounds). 
"Ratification" in the sense of confirming the actions of a person who 
purportedly acted for another is a matter of agency law. In trust law, "ratification" 
is not used in this way, but to mean that the beneficiary is estopped from 
challenging a trustee who did an act otherwise in violation of the trust instrument 
if the beneficiary with capacity approved it.14 For example, suppose the sole 
beneficiary has legal capacity and owns a diversified portfolio of investments in 
addition to the trust property. The beneficiary wants the trustee to invest without 
regard to diversification because the beneficiary is already well diversified outside 
the trust, so the beneficiary asks the trustee not to diversify, but to pick one 
14
 See generally, GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS 625 - 30 (sec. 168) (6th ed. 
1987). 
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common stock with potential for capital appreciation. The trustee does so 
arguably in violation of the trustee's prudent person duty to diversify 
investments.15 
In the language of trust law, the beneficiary has "ratified" the trustee's 
investment in one common stock. The beneficiary will be estopped from suing the 
trustee if the common stock does not pan out. But in no sense did the beneficiary 
act on behalf of the trustee. "Ratification" in trust law is not the same thing as 
"ratification" in agency law. 
Turning back to this case, the Court of Appeals used "ratification" in its 
decision as a variety of agency law created by the trust relationship. It said: 
"Fourth, Security, as trustee, ratified beneficiary Deseret's encumbrance of 
Lot 105A." [2005 UT App 264, para. 39] 
But, the trust relationship does not create agency authority in the beneficiary 
to act on behalf of the trustee. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY says: 
"Sec. 1. Agency; Principle; Agent 
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject 
to his control, and the consent by the other so to act. 
15
 See Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1 - 302 (7) ("trustee shall diversify ") 
(1993). 
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(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal. 
(3) The one who is to act is the agent."16 
A trust beneficiary does not agree to act for the benefit of and subject to the 
control of the trustee. And, "of course, if no agency relationship exists at all, the 
doctrine of ratification [i.e., agency variety] does not apply."17 
Even if there were an agency relationship between Deseret and Security 
Title, Security Title could not ratify the act of Deseret imposing the CC&R's 
because Deseret did not purport to act on behalf of Security Title, but on its own 
behalf. As the RESTATEMENT says: 
"Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind 
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the 
act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by 
him."18 [emphasis added]. 
The "purporting" rule may seem antiquated, but it plays an important role in real 
property law by preserving the chain of title. If Deseret had signed the CC&R's as 
"Security Title Company, trustee, by Deseret Diversified Development, its 
authorized agent," the CC&R's would have been indexed to Security Title in the 
16
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, sec. 1 (1958). 
17
 WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 82 (sec. 
27, Ratification, In General) (3rd ed. 2001). 
18
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY sec. 82 (1958). 
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grantor/grantee index and they would not be a "wild deed." 
Even if Deseret actually were the agent of Security Title, the Utah Statute of 
Frauds requires that the agency be in writing. It is true that there are sufficient 
indications in the record that Deseret may have been an agent of Security Title to 
put Petitioner on inquiry notice, but, to return to the game of baseball, until 
Respondent puts the ball over the plate by producing a written power of attorney, 
Petitioner can just look at the clouds. 
Finally, the most important reason for holding that there was no ratification 
in this case is that the Rerecorded CC&R's are fundamentally inconsistent with the 
plat. In effect, the Rerecorded CC&R's are what are known as "development 
CC&R's." They do not cover a platted subdivision. They cover 320 acres of raw 
land - the rectangular area constituting the south half of section 22. They 
contemplate that this acreage will be sold by acre to people who will work 
together to develop it. For example, the only assessments provided for are for 
"development expenses" prorated by acreage,19 not maintenance expenses pro-
rated by lot. 
Next, please turn to the map, Addendum document "4." The plat and the 
Rerecorded CC&R's do not cover the same geographic area. It makes no sense at 
19
 Rerecorded CC&R's para. 18. 
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all to say that the plat "ratifies" a set of CC&R's that don't even apply to most of 
the plat. Any reasonable person looking at actual provisions of the Rerecorded 
CC&R's and the actual outline of the plat would conclude that Deseret had 
originally intended to develop the south half of Section 22 in cooperation with 
other developers, but then abandoned that plan. Security Title's signing and 
recording the plat does not show it affirmed the Rerecorded CC&R's, but shows it 
regarded them as invalid. 
The Court of Appeals used the abstract term "ratification" as a verbal 
justification for its conclusion, but, again, practical considerations must be taken 
into account. As a practical matter, it is impossible to administer CC&R's that do 
not cover the whole subdivision (and do cover land that is not in the subdivision), 
that do not provide for annual maintenance assessments, and that do not provide 
for who are to be the members of the homeowners' association or how they are to 
vote. These practical considerations must have been known to Security Title and 
Deseret when they platted the land and show that Deseret abandoned the 
Rerecorded CC&R's and that Security Title regarded them as invalid. If Security 
Title had actually wanted to impose the Rerecorded CC&R's on the south east 
corner of the plat, all it had to do was sign and record a declaration to that effect. 
As a title company, surely it knew how to do this. 
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For the reasons stated above, this Court should hold that Deseret as 
beneficial owner had no authority (whether directly as trust beneficiary or indirectly 
on behalf of Security Title as its trustee) to impose binding covenants, conditions 
and restrictions, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial 
court for disposition of the case in accordance with its holding by entering judgment 
that the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien and invahd because it was not signed 
by the owner of record and the Rerecorded CC&R's are not valid and binding. 
Dated: January 12,2006. 
Respectfully submitted: 
/s/ Boyd KimrMTTfyer f 
ATTORN^YFOR PETITIONER/^PELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the forgoing 
Opening Brief (Corrected) by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first 
class postage prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah §^111 -2216 
Dated: January 12,2006 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "1" - THE 1965 BATES DEED 
at .M. Fee Paid* . 
±01972, 
Dcp. Boofc_ 
TJctSIfr— 
Mail tax notice to_ AAA^ fa 3:c'<.U.H3., ^-ilcrof p ^ 168 
WARRANTY DEED ^ ^ V n l ^ 1 Ui* 
vn as F . Ephrala Batea , and * cantor a F , E. BATES, a l i o knovn _ r , 
HAE P. BATES, a l s o known as Hae P r l t c h e t t B a t e s , b i s v l f e 
C o a l v l l l a County of Suszalt 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
S a l t Lake C i t y 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, TRUSTEE, 
* Corporat ion of Utah 
Cov-5tr S a l t Lake 
grantor, a 
State of Utah, hereof 
grantee 
, State of Utah 
for the w a of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER COOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION B Q M C X m 
the following described C 
State cf Utah, cxwitx 
of land in Suraalt and Morgan County, 
The South h a l f o f S e c t i o n 16; the E a s t h a l f o f the S o u t h e a s t 
q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 17; the Eciat h a l f o f the East h a l f o f 
S e c t i o n 2 0 ; a l l o f S e c t i o n s 2 1 , 2 2 , 27 and 2 8 ; t h e East h a l f 
o f the E a s t h a l f o f S e c t i o n 2 9 ; t h e North h a l f and the North 
h a l f o f the South h a l f o f S e c t i o n 3 3 ; the North h a l f and the 
North h a l f o f the South h a l f o£ S e c t i o n 3 4 ; a l l In Tovnship 
1 N o r t h , Range A E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and H e r i d t a n , 
( C o n t a i n i n g ^ p r o x i m a t e l y 4 2 6 4 , 6 8 a c r e s . ) 
TOGETHER WITH a l l v a t e r and v a t e r r i g h t s hovevcr e v i d e n c e d 
appurtenant t o o r used upon or In c o n n e c t i o n v l t h s a i d p r o p e r t y . 
SUBJECT TO easements , r e s t r i c t i o n s and r i g h t s o f v « y appear ing 
o f record or e n f o r c e a b l e In l a v and e q u i t y , and t a x e s for the 
y e a r 1965 and t h e r e a f t e r . 
WITNESS the hand sof said grantors, this 14 th dar of 
Stgoed la oSe pretence of 
October A . D . 1 9 6 5 . 
STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE 
'jCbrtniltaoo Expired 
12 /21 /67 
SSL 
On the 14th day of October A. D. 1965 peraonafly 
appeared befere me F . E. BATES, a l s o knovn aa F . Ephralm B a t e s , 
mad HAS ?• BATES, a l s o knovn aa Ha« P r l t c h e t t lute; 
h i a v l f a 
the ctgncraof «ibe widSln Inatrument who duly acknowledged 
tatnethacth* yexecated the SBSM. 
_ _ _ _ _ 
rJH± _Re«MInf a t . S a l t Laka C l t . y , ^ T a h • 
ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "2" - THE 1971 RERECORDED CC&R'S 
RESERVATIONS -AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
FOREST MEADOW RANCH 
KNOW ALL MhN KY THESE PRESENTS: 
That D«s«ret Diversified Deve] npnif nr, a Utah Corporation, being 
the ovmer of the following described premises, situated within the County 
of Summit, State ©£ Utah, to-viti 
The South half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; which will consist 
of all the luts of the Torest Meadow Ranch Subdivision 
within this area; 
hereby desire to establish and limit the development, use and enjoyment 
of the aforesaid land by making said premises subject to the following 
express reservations, restrictions and covenants; to-wit: 
1. The owner or occupent nf each and every lot of the above 
described area, by acceptance of title theroto or by taking possession 
thereof, regardless of whethor or not the conveyance specifically pro-
vides therefor, covenants and agrees to accept, be bound by, to act in 
accordance with and not to abrogate or act in contradiction of any of the 
reservations and restrictive covenants herein enumerated. 
2. The Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association (FMRPOA) 
shall and aTe hereby named responsible for the administration and entorce-
ment of the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated herein. For 
that purpose the FMRPOA shall appoint or elect one or more persons to a 
committee formed for the exclusive purpose of administrating and enforc-
ing the provisions herein set forth. This committee shall be known as 
the Environmental Control Committee (JECC) and is empowered to set up 
reasonable rules and regulations to properly administer and enforce these 
requirements„ Vhi* committee xhall also have the power to make reason-
able exceptions, for cause showing, to anv and all reservations and 
restrictive covenants horoin enumerated whether spocifically so provided 
or not, 
3. The minimum lot or parcel siic of said property shall be 
twenty thousand square feet In area, therefore no property owner of said 
property shall subdivide his lot OT lots in such a manner that any lot 
or parcel shall be less than approximately one-half acre, more or less 
in area; nevertheless. no resubdivision whatsoever of the lots and 
layouts of Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivision shall be permissible within 
five years unless acrompHshed by other than thrnngh public. Advertising, 
however, in no event shall for sale signs or other visual displays ever 
bo allowed on said property. 
4. Only perxMHueiii structures, that arc in conformance with the 
specifications and requirements of and after proper approval from the' 
ECC, Summit County and any required State Agency or Organisation shall 
be constructed, errected, moved on to, or maintained on said property. 
Wo temporary structure of any kind or size shall be permittod except 
(1) when used for a reasonable period to aid in the construction of an 
approved structure, or (2) for brief vacation periods. The terra struc-
ture shall mean for this paragraph and for all other paragraphs of this 
document the following: Any building, improvement, shack, tent, trailer, 
mobile home, dwelling place> garage, storage shed, and any other type of 
structure having similar characteristics of the aforementioned items. To 
implement the procedure r e q u i r e d haTflin a prnp/*rry nwner <>b?ill f o l l o w 
the following steps before taking any steps towards putt ing a structure 
on h i s p r o p e r t y : 
a) Check with the ECC to obtain any prepared 
spec i f i ca t ions or requirements for 3aid s t ruc tures . 
•r^-fctrrfl* (.13.788 . _6«>i. .H..1?.. 
RECORDCD.fc.^ -'/l .. tt?sV M -•&$*?• W. 
REQUEST of :«i>?.r^ .• ^ds..*.1""*0 
FEE VANCA. T WM6QS. lUMMIf CO t'COkOtft 
4f1fc«ftCB . 
[i9£».~ > By^<a^<^ | r ^^^ jw fK . . 
i-M NU. 4dbblbfbU2 P. 03/05 
* 
bj Submit preliminary plans to the ECC for approval. 
c) Submit evidence that a l l County and Srptfi rftquirrtmrtnr^ 
have been complied with* 
dj After approval, proceed only in accordance with the 
direct ions of and in compliance with the plans approved 
by the BCC. 
5. No structure constructed, erected or maintained on any l o t 
or portion thereof s h a l l c o n s i s t of l e s s than 400 square feet of l i v i n g 
area, not including carport or garages. 
6. Only one dwelling w i l l be permitted per one-half a c r c t / 
although a c lus ter ing of dwel l ings w i l l bo permitted on mult i -acre l o t s 
when approved by the ECC* Spec ia l v e ^n i s s ion must be obtained from the 
ECC, before more than two s truc tures of any kind or s i z e sha l l be per-
mitted on any l o t , regardless of the l e t s i z e . 
7. No s tructure , or any paTt thereof , s h a l l be constructed , 
erected or maintained on any l o t c loser than one hundred (100) f«ftt. 
to Any lo t boundary l ine or road right-of-way. 
8. NO signs or other advertisements s h a l l be erected or 
maintained on sa id property or any structure thereon* 
9. No animals, except a reasonable number of domestic pets 
(dogs, c a t s , e t c . ) horses and l i v e s t o c k , may be kept , bred, or ra i sed on 
said property; nor may any animal including the above exceptions be kept , 
bred or raised for any commercial purposes on s a i d property. The ECC 
shal l determine what is a reasonable number. 
10. Mo garbage, re fuge , obnoxious or o f f e n s i v e material or 
o b j e c t s , weeds or any other uns ight ly growth s h a l l be permitted to accum-
ulate , grow or remain on any s a i d l o t s . The property owner s h a l l dispose 
of any of the above described condit ions mid i tems in accordance with 
accepted sani tary pract i ces and in accordance with the ECC rules and 
requirements, in the event any property owneT f a i l s to k^on h i s property C 
free from the above described condit ions and i t e m s , then after a ten day u 
written not ice to .so comply and the fa i lure of the property owner to so ^ 
act , the ECC may onter (such entry sha l l not be deemed a t re s sp as s ) upon *• 
such land and dispose of said condi t ions or items at the expense of the * 
owner (due and payable immediately) and any expense incurred thereby sha l l 
be a l i e n against said property in favor of the FMRPOA u n t i l paid in f u l l 
and the c o l l e c t i o n of said expenses sha l l be p e r m i s s i b l e through a l l l egal 
means including i n t e r e s t , cos ts of court and reasonable at torney's f e e s . ^ 
11. Only natural f«nces and natural l ook ing fences s h a l l be ^ 
permitted as boundary l i n e s , no barbed wire or chain l i n k fences may be ^ 
used for such purposes. Within the property owner's boundary l i n e s and farq 
a l imited area and use only, any type of fence may be used, subject to 
ECC approval. 
12. No hunting or firearms of any nature , s i z e or kind s h a l l be 
permitted within the area covered by the Forest Meadow Ranch Subdiv i s ions , f 
except within s p e c i f i c a l l y approved areas , i f any, by the ECC. °J 
13. The flow of any stream, creek or spr ing may not be stopped r x 
or dammed up nor may any l o t or parce l be increased in s i z e by f i l l i n g in W 
the water that abntts i t . Th* e l eva t ion of any l o t s h a l l not be changed ^ 
so as to mater ia l ly e f f e c t the surface e l e v a t i o n or grade of the s u r r o u n d - ^ 
ing l o t s . No rock, gravel or c lay s h a l l be excavated or removed from any 
lo t for commercial purposes. 
14. All. vahic le* op«Tated on said property sha l l be p r o p e i l / £D 
l i censed , inspected and maintained so as not to create a dangerous s i t - *^ 
uation, become a nuisance, nor emit unreasonable smoke, o i l or n o i s e : ^ 
said vehic les sna i l be operated only on the properly defined roads and £5 
rights-of-ways and not in any manner which w i l l cause damage or harm to ti-tr-j 
natural environment and landscape of said property. The ECC sha l l have 
the power to r e s t r i c t the use of any vehic le which creates such a nusiancc 
or noise so as to prevent the majority from the proper enjoyment of t h e i r 
property. 
15, Extramo caution must be exercised in the handling of f i r e , 
therefore no open f i r e s shal l be permitted except in areas and/or device 
such as f i re p i t s , approved by the ECC. A f i re ex t ingu i sher sha l l bo 
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^required before any fire of any size may be started (ignited). The V.cc 
shall properly provide notice of these requirements to all property users 
and set up fines and penalties for thero violation. 
16. The development of facilities for the disposal of sewage 
waste shall be accomplished only after approval and inspection of and in 
accordance with rules and regulations of the Utah State Division of 
Health and the Summit County Health Department and specifically Part IV 
of the Code of Waste Disposal Regulations$ Utah State Division of Health. 
17, Dcscvct Diversified Development, does reserve the right with 
respect to the property covered hereby to determine the course, extent and 
direction of any casowefits necessary tor the purpose of installing and 
maintaining any publ:c utility facilities and for such other purposes 
common!- incidental to the development of said property. All claims for 
damages, if any, arising out of the construction, maintenance and repair 
of utilities or on account of temporary or other inconvenience caused 
thereby against Deseret Diversified n*v*lopm«nt# or any utility company 
or municipality, or any of its agents or servants are*hereby waived by 
the owners. Deseret Diversified Development docs further reserve the 
right to change, establish, lay out a now, or discontinue any road, .street, 
right-of-vAy or casement which may be at any time established necessary 
or not necessary for ingress or egress to and from an owner1s lot, subject 
to the approval of an/ governmental authority, it required. The property 
convoyed in Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions are so conveyed subj^rr to 
the right of Dcseiet Diversified Development, as in this Paragraph 17 
provided, which right may be exercised by Deserot niv*rsifiod Development 
without compensation to a property owner. 
IB. In the event Deseret Diversified Development or FMRPOA 
desire or are required by any governmental authority to develop improve-
ments, including but not limited to electricity, gas, telephone, sewers, 
water, etc.. all property owners, occupants, users OT their assigns of 
the real property covered hereby shall connect to and become a user of 
said faculties within o reasonable time after installation and shall 
be responsible for their proportionate share of the development expenses, OsJ 
costs and charges. Said proportionate share shall be calculated on a O^ 
per*acre or portion thereof basis-and due thirty days before constructionJJ\ 
LU 
19, The violation of any of the reservations or covenants <-0 
h*r«in sot out by any property owner, occupant, or person claiming under ** 
them or any .other porson shall be subiect to prosecution by any other ri-
property owner of the real property included herein, the FMRPOA or 
Deseret Diversified Development, said prosecution may tako the form ^J 
of any le^al proceeding in law or equity against the offending person or °^v 
persons and way seek any and all lawful remedy therefor. In addition to ^ 
the tort going rights, the FMRPOA, the BCC or Deseret Diversified Develop- ^ 
roent jointly or severally, shall have the right, whenever there shall ^ 
have been built on any lot any structure which is in violation of these £g 
restrictions, to inter upon the property where such violation of these 
Reservations and Restrictions exists and summarily abate or remov? the 
same at the expense of the uwncr, which expense snail become a lien upon 
the property from which rcraovod and any such entry and abatement or removal 
shall not be doomed a trespass. The failure promptly to enforce any of 
the Reservations and Restrictions shall not bar their enforcement. 
20, Invalidation o£ any of t.h* provisions of thia document by 
judgment or court order shall in no wise affect any of the other provisions 
herein, which shall remain in full force and effect:. ^ * 
21. Should the owner fail, neglect or rnfuso ZO satisfy and *"*"* 
discharge any fine, lien or penalty arising, hereunder within thirty °^ 
(-0) days, or it should becomo necessary to enforce the provisions herein,^ 
the FMRPOA, th* ECC and/or Deseret Diversified Development a- the case ^ 
may be, shall hpv* th* right to interest on such fine, lien «~r penalty Q_ 
at the rate of one and one-half percent per month until paid and shall be 
entitled to roceivc all costs of collection and/or enforcement including . 
a reasonable attorney's fee. J^ 
22. The reservations and restrictive covenants herein set out 
are to run vith the land and shall be binding upon ail persons owning ^ 
or occupying any lot, parcel or portion of the real property enumerated ^ 
at the beginning hereoi until January 1, 1990, and for successive twenty JQQ 
(20) year periods unless within six (6) mnnths of the end of the initial 
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period or any twenty (20) ye*r period thereafter a written agreement 
executed by the then record owners of more than three-quarters (7>/4) in 
aren of ssid real property included herein is recorded with tl;e Summit 
County Recorder and the terms of said agreement change, modify or extinguish 
in whole or in part the reservations and restrictive covenants enumerated 
herein. Thereafter, these reservations and restrictive covenants as 
changed, modified,or extinguished by said agreement shall continue in force 
for successive twenty (20) year periods, until they are changed, modified 
or extinguished in the manner herein provided, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT hns 
caused this document to be executed in its name by its President, thi3 
f ** day of July, 1971. 
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT 
ATTEST: 
v .secretary ecretary 
""^^zfe^2 m^dtXtJmt^aSCX^^' •* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
me 
0 n c h e
 j £ _ L d a > r o f J u l y > 1 9^1 persona l ly appeared before 
, who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he i s the President of Deseret D i v e r s i f i e d Development and 
that s a i d instrument was s igned in behalf o£ s a i d corporation by author-
i ty . o ^ L t s ^ y f laws , and s a i d <u>. & » ~ # ^ 
acJC^i^e*9^4^wJRe that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at. :3^/C^wZL& £wJ3£T" 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "3" - THE 1972 PLAT OF FOREST MEADOW RANCH 
PLAT "D" 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "4" - MAP SHOWING RELATIONSHIP OF FOREST 
MEADOW RANCH PLAT "D" TO SECTION 22, SECTION 21, AND LOT 105A 
'"N /" 
16 
MAP 
ch HUT u 
/•.?/ RAXCE Jo t-4. ./• 
•LTAH 
/ 
I 
/ 
/ 
V 
y 't n.- e£.-.N i... v. : 
r. --£0*^ •.•tvI-iPTiO'. ".3:; 
V 
S* * Q 
»* :\ o —i 
o, - ai x • 
oi ja *-« ^ 
I ™ 
o -< 
L 
O 
^ " • ' " ' • " . y 
A ^ .r^A 
pom; 
o >3 
t*J 
•-0 
"~3 
S; 
c*i 
^ 
fa 
o ^ 
70 
^ 
^ 
o 
^ 
n^ 
i> 
^ 
t*] 
• * 
i; 
^ 
to 
••^  
^ 
M
AP 
ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "5" -1980 NOTICE OF LD2N. 
When recorded return to: 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
1104 Ashton Avenue #203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841G6 
1 E «* 
REQU: -
FEE 
~~~> «Z^?->v* , t / r : y^M PiQc/X3 
••Al " » v f . 6 S , SUMMIT CO I^ COAOCR 1 
_ / r,!fACT & «j J A 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That pursuant to that certain document entitled "Reservations 
and Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch" dated July 8, 1971 
and filed for record July 22, 1971 as entry No. 113593, Book No. 
M32 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State 
of Utah and also that certain document entitled "Reservations and 
Protective Covenants, Pine Meadow Ranch", dated August 15, 1973 
and filed for record on September 28, 1973 as entry 120967, Book No. M-50, 
office of the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
claims a continuing lien upon the following described real property 
for the payment of annual maintenance assessment, annual water share 
fees, special maintenance assessments, penalties and interest on any 
or all of said items: 
Plat A, Pine Meadov/ Ranch, Lots 1 through 81 
Plat B, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 49 
Plat C, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 06> 
Plat D, Pine Meadow Ranch, Lots 1 through 104 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat A, Lots 1 through 14 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat B, Lots 15 through 39 
Forest Meadow Ranch Dlat C, Lots 40 through 86 
Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, Lots 86 through 181 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that prior to the sale or conveyance of 
any said real property, a Certificate of Good Standing should be 
obtained therefor from the Pine Meadov; Ranch Assocxation, 1104 Ashton 
Avenue, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, indicating that: all 
outstanding assessments have been paid in full; otherwise a purchaser 
may be responsible for payment of prior delinquent assessments. 
Dated: 
By 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association 
It *l^  President Q 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNT* OF SALT LAKE 
On the J* bofore me Gerald P 
who duly acknowledged 
day of ^fLU'V- , 1980, personally appeared 
Langton, the/ sWner of the foregoing ir)i".trora>?nt, 
i to me thax he* executed the same. /'*»!-'^  ***.' *, 
Notary ,1/ubl IC ' - / T / 
Residing a t : /££/ y^^*^\ 
MyCofTlfTV- ''* '* l ^ ^ o n £*, 
'+«* Oct l ? . , 
o 
—I 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "6" - OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 3 0 2005 
Forest Meadow Ranch Property 
Owners Association, L.L.C, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home 
Association aka Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Owners Association 
and as Pine Meadow Ranch 
Association, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040397-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 30, 2005) 
2005 UT App 264 
Third District, Silver Summit Department, 000600092 
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Attorneys: Boyd Kimball Dyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Edwin C. Barnes and Walter A. Romney, Jr., Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
fl Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, 
L.L.C. appeals the trial court's grant of Respondent Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Association's motion for summary judgment. 
Specifically, Petitioner argues that, as a matter of law, 
Respondent's lien is unenforceable because (1) the 1971 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (the 1971 CC&Rs), as the 
basis for the lien, violate Utah's statute of frauds, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998) ; (2) the doctrine of descriptio 
personae applies; (3) the 1971 CC&Rs do not run with the land for 
want of privity; (4) the beneficiary of a trust may not encumber 
trust property; (5) the doctrine of uniformity applies; and (6) 
the lien violates Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to -7 (2001). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 The essential facts are not disputed. In 1965, F.E. and 
M.P. Bates executed a duly recorded warranty deed (the Bates 
Deed), conveying land, part of which later became known as the 
Forest Meadow Subdivision,1 to Security Title Company (Security) . 
In the Bates Deed, Security was listed as "trustee," but no 
beneficiary or trust was described. 
f3 On March 18, 1971, W. Brent Jensen (Jensen)2 created Deseret 
Diversified Development, Inc. (Deseret) by filing its articles of 
incorporation with the Secretary of State. 
^4 On July 8, 1971, Deseret, identifying itself as the "owner" 
of the "described premises"--"The South half of Section 22, 
Township 1 South, [ ] Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian"4 
--executed the 1971 CC&Rs. The 1971 CC&Rs were signed by Jensen, 
as president of Deseret, and stated that "[t]he reservations and 
restrictive covenants herein set out are to run with the land." 
While the 1971 CC&Rs make no specific reference to annual 
homeowners association assessments, they do provide for a 
homeowners association to administer and enforce the 1971 CC&Rs. 
f5 Later in 1972, Deseret and Security, described as owners, 
recorded Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" (Plat D) . Plat D created 
1. Another portion of the land transferred in the Bates Deed 
became the Pine Meadow Subdivision. At some point, the 
homeowners associations of the Forest Meadow Subdivision and the 
Pine Meadow Subdivision merged, thereafter operating as a single 
entity. It appears that their merger resulted in an 
unincorporated association rather than a corporation or other 
business entity. 
2. Jensen wore many hats. For instance, he was president of 
both Security and Deseret, as well as developer of both the 
Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow Subdivisions. 
3. "Township 1 South" was an incorrect description. The 
relevant property should have been described as "Township 1 
North." Later, on August 19, 1971, to correct this error, Jensen 
rerecorded the 1971 CC&Rs altered only to reflect the appropriate 
description. The rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were properly stamped and 
referenced the book and page numbers of the original recording. 
4. Petitioner's property--Lot 105A--is partially within the 
north half of Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian and partially within the south half of the 
same. 
the Forest Meadow Subdivision and marked the boundaries of Lot 
105. 
%6 On January 15, 1975, Security conveyed title to Lot 105, by 
special warranty deed, to Jensen Investment, Jensen Investment 
took the deed "[s]ubject to easements, restrictions, reservations 
and rights of way appearing of record or enforceable in law and 
equity." This deed was recorded January 16, 1975. That same 
day, Jensen Investment conveyed by warranty deed the eastern half 
of Lot 105--Lot 105A--to C.E. and S.M. Clark (the Clarks), only 
to have the Clarks quitclaim Lot 105A back to Jensen Investment. 
It is alleged that the design of this transaction was to 
recombine Lot 105; however, it is unclear from the record what 
Jensen Investment gained by this transaction. 
U7 On July 22, 1975, Jensen Investment conveyed Lot 105A to 
H.E. and M.C. Waldhouse (the Waldhouses) by warranty deed. This 
deed was recorded July 23, 1975. 
1f8 In 1980, Respondent recorded a notice of lien (the 1980 
Notice of Lien), citing the 1971 CC&Rs, and claiming that Lot 
105A, among others, had a "continuing lien" against it "for the 
payment of annual maintenance assessment[s]." 
119 On December 12, 1988, the Waldhouses conveyed Lot 105A to 
S.J. Oakanson aka S.J. Liftos by warranty deed, but reserved Lot 
105A's oil, gas, and mineral rights. This deed was recorded 
December 13, 198 8. 
HlO On October 15, 1998, S.J. Oakanson granted Lot 105A to Axel 
Grabowski by warranty deed, "subject to easements, restrictions 
and rights of way currently of record." This deed was recorded 
October 29, 1998. 
Kll On December 9, 1999, Axel Grabowski quitclaimed Lot 105A to 
Petitioner--an "association" consisting solely of Axel Grabowski. 
This deed was recorded December 10, 1999. 
1|12 In 2003, Respondent recorded a-clarification to the 1980 
Notice of Lien (the 2003 Clarification), submitting that the 1980 
Notice of Lien created no new lien, but rather, merely 
republished the existing CC&Rs. 
fl3 Respondent currently has an annual budget of approximately 
$140,000, consisting mostly of proceeds from annual homeowners 
assessments on over 800 lots. Respondent claims that it uses 
this money to provide its members benefits, such as maintaining 
and insuring private roads, open spaces, and power lines 
throughout the subdivisions. Respondent also contends that 
membership in the homeowners association is mandatory via the 
1971 CC&Rs. 
fl4 Petitioner, seeking to avoid Respondents assertion of 
authority over Lot 105A, originally filed an action for summary 
relief under the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 38-9-1 to -7, arguing that Deseret did not have any interest 
in the property when it recorded the 1971 CC&Rs, Thereafter, the 
parties conducted discovery. In late 2003, the parties asked the 
trial court to determine the case on summary judgment, indicating 
that there were "no facts to try." In 2004, the trial court 
granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment and denied 
Petitioner's like motion. 
Ul5 In the course of reviewing Respondent's proposed judgment, 
Petitioner discovered the discrepancy between the originally 
recorded 1971 CC&Rs and the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs--"Township 1 
South" on the original 1971 CC&Rs and "Township 1 North" on the 
rerecorded CC&Rs. Petitioner thereafter referred to the 
rerecorded CC&Rs as the "Fabricated 1971 CC&Rs," and brought a 
second motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
rerecorded CC&Rs were invalid, and thus, Lot 105A was not within 
the description of the 1971 CC&Rs. The trial court denied 
Petitioner's second motion for summary judgment. Petitioner 
appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Kl6 Petitioner appeals the trial court's grant of Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper only 
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56<c). When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion 
for summary judgment, this court reviews for correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, and 
considers all evidence and reasonable inferences derived 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below. 
See Black v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004 UT 66,^9, 100 P.3d 1163. 
ANALYSIS 
fl7 Arguing that the trial court erred in granting Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment, Petitioner asserts that, as a matter 
of law, Respondent's lien is unenforceable because (1) the 1971 
CC&Rs violate Utah's statute of frauds, see Utah Code Ann. § 25-
5-1; (2) the doctrine of descriptio personae applies; (3) the 
1971 CC&Rs do not run with the land for want of privity; (4) the 
beneficiary of a trust may not encumber trust property; (5) the 
doctrine of uniformity applies; and (6) the lien violates Utah's 
Wrongful Lien Statute, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to -7. 
A. Utah's Statute of Frauds 
fl8 In the instant case, we encounter a correction that modifies 
previously filed CC&Rs. "Because covenants that run with the 
land must be based on some interest in land, the statute of 
frauds must be satisfied." Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton 
Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 629 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted). 
Likewise, a correction to a covenant running with the land must 
also satisfy the statute of frauds. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 11,1[13 n.4, 40 P.3d 1119 (noting "that if an 
original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement that modifies the original agreement must also satisfy 
the requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable.11). 
fl9 Petitioner avers that Utah's statute of frauds prevents 
enforcement of the 1971 CC&Rs against Lot 105A, noting that the 
1971 CC&Rs were originally recorded with an error in the 
description of the affected property--"Township 1 South." While 
Deseret later rerecorded the 1971 CC&Rs with the proper 
description--"Township 1 North"--Petitioner claims the rerecorded 
1971 CC&Rs violated the statute because they were identical to 
the originally recorded 1971 CC&Rs save the first page, which 
corrected the description. Therefore, Petitioner claims that the 
signature appearing on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs applied only to 
the original 1971 CC&Rs, and thus, did not satisfy the statute of 
frauds r s subscription requirement. 
[^20 Respondent counters that the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs merely 
corrected a scrivener's error, and this was deemed an acceptable 
remedy by the Summit County Clerk. 
f21 Utah's statute of frauds states: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
5. The Utah Supreme Court in R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 
11, 40 P.3d 1119, uses the term "modification." Id. at fl3 n.4. 
However, because a "correction" is "the act or an instance of 
making right what is wrong," Black's Law Dictionary 347 (7th ed. 
1999), and a "modification" is "a change to something," id. at 
1020, it follows that a correction is a modification, although 
the reverse is not necessarily true. 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Because the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were 
no doubt in writing, if they were subscribed by Deseret, then the 
statute of frauds is not an impediment to their enforcement. 
f22 "Subscribed" generally means physically signed. See Black's 
Law Dictionary 1441 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "subscription" as 
"[t]he act of signing one's name on a document."). Ultimately^ 
subscription requires covenants to have attached to them a 
signature of an authorized party, thereby authenticating the 
document. It does not matter that the signature was originally 
put to paper for another document. See 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of 
Frauds § 273 (2001) . What is essential, however, is that the 
signing party intend for the signature to have effect on the 
document to which it is attached. See id. Indeed, "[t]he 
statute may be satisfied by the act of the parties in adopting 
their signatures on an old contract to authenticate a new 
agreement." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Prigge v. Olsen, 47 
N.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Neb. 1951) ("A signature to satisfy the 
statute of frauds may be on any appropriate writing placed there 
by the party to be bound or authorized, adopted, or appropriated 
by him with the intent, actual or apparent, to give force and 
effect to the writing."). 
1123 Here, there is no evidence or indication suggesting Deseret 
intended to deceive, mislead, or act fraudulently. Deseret 
adopted the original subscription in the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs, 
evidenced by the presence of the original, as well as the new 
recordation information on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs. This 
historical recordation information on the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs 
squares with the apparent intent of the signer--Jensen--to 
subdivide and develop the land granted in the Bates Deed. 
Indeed, the same party filed both the original and the rerecorded 
1971 CC&Rs, both of which were accepted by the Summit County 
Clerk's office. Furthermore, there were no intervening actions. 
Thus, the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were validly subscribed, and 
therefore, withstand Petitioner's statute of frauds challenge. 
B. The Doctrine of Descriptio Personae 
f24 "Descriptio personae" is a doctrine whereby a court 
disregards tangential titles added to a person's name or 
signature. See TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70,f8, 66 P. 3d 
1031 (defining "descriptio personae" as "'the use of a word or 
phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended and 
not as an intimation that the language in connection with which 
it occurs is to apply to him only in the technical character 
which might appear to be indicated by the word1" (quoting Dann v. 
Team Bank, 788 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)). This 
doctrine was validated by the Utah Supreme Court in Boise Cascade 
Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). 
See TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at %9. 
f25 Petitioner contends that Respondent shoulders the burden to 
show both that a trust existed and that descriptio personae does 
not apply to the Bates Deed--wherein Security took title as 
"trustee" without evidence of the existence of a trust or 
beneficiary. Petitioner continues that if descriptio personae 
applies, Security was the outright fee owner of Lot 105A, 
rendering any CC&Rs filed by Deseret unauthorized. 
Alternatively, Petitioner claims that if this court rules 
descriptio personae inapplicable, nevertheless, Deseret could not 
have been the intended beneficiary of any trust because Deseret 
was not incorporated until March 18, 1971, years after the 
execution and delivery of the Bates Deed. 
^26 Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that descriptio 
personae does not automatically shift the burden to it to show 
the trust's existence. Furthermore, Respondent claims that, 
descriptio personae notwithstanding, extrinsic evidence indicates 
Security was trustee for the benefit of interests that later 
became Deseret. 
1(27 Both parties rely on TWN, 2003 UT App 70. In TWN, a grantor 
twice conveyed a parcel of real property. See id. at ^3-4. In 
the first instance, the grantor, listing himself on the deed as 
"Richard Christensen, Trustee," conveyed the parcel to the 
defendant. See id. at |^3. Later, the grantor, this time 
identifying himself on the deed only as "Richard Christensen, ff 
conveyed the parcel to the plaintiff. See id. at f 4. The trial 
court granted the plaintiff's motion fox summary judgment, 
reasoning that, in the first conveyance, the grantor did not 
convey his personal interest in the parcel; rather, the first 
"deed conveyed only whatever interest Mr. Christensen held on 
behalf of an unnamed trust, which was apparently nothing." Id. 
at f5 (footnote omitted). This court, however, reversed, ruling: 
"The unexplained use of the word 'trustee1 on a real property 
deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation 
or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust 
interest." Id. at ^12. We went on to enumerate two, apparently 
exhaustive, methods for a trustee to overcome the descriptio 
personae presumption. See id. at fl4\ First, " [a] trustee-
grantor should include on the deed such language as ' in my 
capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust, ,H Id. "Alternatively, as 
the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise Cascade Corp., [655 
P. 2d at 669,] a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show 
that a trust was, in fact, intended." TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at 
fl4. Absent a showing of one of these circumstances, "the 
presumption of descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will 
operate as if the word 'trustee1 were not there," Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
K2 8 In this case, because Security did not include in the deed 
language such as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust, " 
descriptio personae will presumptively apply unless Respondent 
presented sufficient extrinsic evidence to the trial court "to 
show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id. 
^29 Here, unlike TWN, there were no competing title interests or 
claims when the 1971 CC&Rs were filed. Indeed, it is undisputed 
that Petitioner's title traces back to Security, which took title 
as "trustee." Additionally, Security is a title company, an 
organization that often holds title to property as trustee. Seef 
e.g. , Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699 (designating a 
title company as trustee); Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 
1366, 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same). Furthermore, in Plat D, 
Deseret was listed as subdivider and owner, and Security was 
identified as trustee and owner. While Jensen was certainly 
cavalier in his documentation, this extrinsic evidence is 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of descriptio personae. 
Because we determine that a trust was intended, we must next 
assess whether Deseret may be a beneficiary of that trust. 
^30 Generally, a private trust must have "a definite 
beneficiary." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 (1) (c) (Supp. 2004). 
Respondent urges that the interests that later became Deseret 
were the saLme as the beneficiaries of the trust naming Security 
as trustee, and that those beneficiaries were sufficiently 
definite. Indeed, the facts appear to support this conclusion 
that Deseret was the beneficial owner despite the lack of 
comprehensive documentation. Jensen signed on behalf of both 
Security and Deseret; listed himself as president of Security and 
incorporator of Deseret; and utilized the term "trustee" only for 
Security. Moreover, Deseret signed the 1971 CC&Rs as beneficial 
owner and developer. Such evidence is consistent with a scheme 
in which Deseret would oversee the development of the property 
granted in the Bates Deed. As such, we conclude the word 
"trustee" on the 1971 CC&Rs, together with extrinsic evidence, 
reflect the existence of a trust, with Deseret as beneficiary. 
C. Privity of Estate 
^31 Petitioner next posits that the 1971 CC&Rs fail to run with 
the land for want of privity, and therefore, are unenforceable 
against Lot 105A. 
f32 "It is well-established that, if- recorded, the documents 
setting forth the plat designations for general plan developments 
can have the effect of creating restrictive covenants that are 
binding on all subsequent development." View Condo. Owners 
Assoc, v. MSICO, L L C . 2004 UT App 104,1(16, 90 P.3d 1042. As 
the CC&Rs in the instant case were recorded, they may create 
enforceable covenants that run with the land. "Further, although 
subsequent purchasers may not have had an interest in the 
property at the time that the general plan was enacted, the law 
holds that those purchasers are entitled to enforce any covenants 
that may have been validly created." Id. Thus, the fact that 
Respondent did not exist when the CC&Rs were created does not 
necessarily prevent Respondent from enforcing the CC&Rs. 
f 33 At law, " [a] covenant that runs with the land must have the 
following characteristics: (1) The covenant must 'touch and 
concern1 the land; (2) the covenanting parties must intend the 
covenant to run with the land; . . . (3) there must be privity of 
estate"; and (4) the covenant must be in writing. Flying Diamond 
Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622-23, 629 (Utah 
1989) (footnotes omitted). Petitioner challenges only the 
privity element. 
1[34 "Privity of estate requires a particular kind of 
relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee." 
Id. at 628. There are three types of privity of estate: (1) 
mutual--"a covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the 
same land"; (2) horizontal--"a covenant created in connection 
with a conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to 
another"; and (3) vertical--"the devolution of an estate burdened 
or benefitted by a covenant from an original covenanting party to 
a successor." Id. When investigating the existence of privity, 
substance should prevail over technical form. See id. at 628 
n.13 (referencing Neponsit Prop. Owner's Assfn v. Emigrant Indus. 
Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938)). 
f35 "[P]rivity exists here on traditional grounds." Id. For 
instance, there is horizontal privity here because the 1971 CC&Rs 
were created in anticipation of subdividing and selling lots. 
Furthermore, vertical privity exists because Petitioner is a 
successor to the estate of the original covenanting parties.6 
D. Beneficiary's Power to Encumber Trust Property 
^36 Petitioner next argues that because Deseret had only a 
beneficial interest in the land granted in the Bates Deed, 
Deseret could not encumber Lot 105A. However, Petitioner cites 
no authority stating that a beneficiary cannot encumber the trust 
res. In fact, there is authority to the contrary. See Capital 
Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9,fl7, 994 P.2d 201 
(holding beneficial interest in real property could encumber that 
interest). In any event, we will not lose sight of the forest 
for the trees. Deseret1s actions were subsequently ratified by 
Security when Deseret and Security filed Plat D. As such, it is 
disingenuous to suggest that Security did not know about the 1971 
CC&Rs because Deseret and Security were working together. 
Indeed, Security later transferred title to the lots to Deseret 
to develop, further manifesting their collaboration. In the end, 
the 1971 CC&Rs became contracts between the homeowners 
association and its members. Further, the homeowners association 
operated pursuant to its bylaws to make assessments; maintain and 
insure private roads, open spaces, and power lines; and provide 
other benefits to its members. 
E. Doctrine of Uniformity 
^3 7 Petitioner avers that the doctrine of uniformity prohibits 
the enforcement of the 1971 CC&Rs because they govern only the 
northern part of Lot 105A. However, the doctrine of uniformity 
has not been adopted in Utah. Furthermore, because Petitioner 
has not demonstrated a lack of sufficient uniformity among 
similarly situated owners, we need not address whether the 
doctrine of uniformity should apply in Utah. 
F. Wrongful Lien Statute 
^38 Finally, Petitioner asserts that the 1980 Notice of Lien 
Respondent filed against Lot 105A is wrongful because it is not 
authorized by the 1971 CC&Rs. The 1980 Notice of Lien states 
that, based on the 1971 CC&Rs, Respondent "claims a continuing 
lien upon [Lot 105A among others] for the payment of annual 
maintenance assessment[s] ." Thus, it appears that Respondent's 
6. "Vertical privity exists in all covenant situations except 
where a successor to the burdened or benefitted land is an 
adverse possessor or a disseisor." Flying- Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 628 n.12 (Utah 1989} (quotations 
and citation omitted) . 
lien was grounded in the 1971 CC&Rs, rather than the 1980 Notice 
of Lien itself. Therefore, the 1980 Notice of Lien merely 
republished the 1971 CC&Rs. 
CONCLUSION 
f39 First, the rerecorded 1971 CC&Rs were adequately subscribed 
because Deseret adopted the subscription from the original 1971 
CC&Rs. Second, there is sufficient extrinsic evidence indicating 
the existence of a trust with Deseret as beneficiary to overcome 
the presumptive application of descriptio personae. Third, 
traditional notions of privity of estate exist, allowing the 1971 
CC&Rs to run with the land. Fourth, Security, as trustee, 
ratified beneficiary Deseretfs encumbrance of Lot 105A. Fifth, 
the doctrine of uniformity has not been adopted in Utah, and 
Petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to warrant an 
examination of the doctrine in this case. Finally, the 1980 
Notice of Lien was not a new lien, but rather merely republished 
the existing 1971 CC&Rs. 
f40 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
f41 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, ^—~ 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, JjSdge 
